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Introduction 
In 2011, major cell service providers in the United States received 
over 1.3 million requests from law enforcement officials for customer 
records.1 Typically, these requests are made due to an ongoing 
 
1. Will Oremus, Law Enforcement Wants Your Private Cellphone Data. Wireless 
Carriers Will Hand it Over, for a Fee, Slate (July 9, 2012, 5:10 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2012/07/09/ed_markey_wireless_ 
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criminal investigation in which the government seeks to prove that a 
suspect was near a certain location at a certain time based on cell-site 
location information (“CSLI”) recorded by the service providers. In 
short, CSLI is a record of the cell towers to which the user’s cell 
phone connects when the user places and ends a phone call. This, in 
turn, indicates an approximate location of the cell phone. Usually, law 
enforcement only needs a court order to make these requests. 
Take, for example, United States v. Carpenter.2 In 2011, Police 
arrested four men suspected of robbing various RadioShack and T-
Mobile stores in the Detroit, Michigan area.3 One of the men con-
fessed that the group had robbed nine stores in Michigan and Ohio, 
and he also implicated fifteen other men.4 The man provided the FBI 
with the phone numbers of some of the participants.5 The FBI then 
obtained court orders to acquire “transactional records” from the par-
ticpants’ cell service providers for sixteen phone lines.6 The magistrate 
required a showing of “specific and articulable facts” that demonstrate 
“there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or 
electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, 
are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation” to 
issue the orders.7 The records included cell-site location information 
that helped to prove that two of the suspects were within a half-mile 
to two miles of several robberies at the time that they occurred.8 
These two suspects, Timothy Carpenter and Timothy Sanders, were 
subsequently convicted of nine armed robberies in violation of the 
Hobbs Act.9 The two men appealed their convictions and sentences to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. They argued 
that their cell-site location information should have been suppressed 
because acquiring the records constituted a search under the Fourth 
Amendment, and therefore the police needed a warrant supported by 
probable cause.10 The Sixth Circuit rejected this argument. The court 
held that the government’s collection of business records containing 
 
 surveillance_report_law_enforcement_requests_private_cell_phone_data_1
_3_million_times_a_year.html [https://perma.cc/5JNH-32G9]. 
2. 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017). 
3. Id. at 884. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 885. 
9. Id. at 884–85. 
10. Id. at 885–86. 
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cell-site data was not a search under the Fourth Amendment because 
the user voluntarily relinquished the information to a third party, the 
service provider.11 On June 5, 2017, the Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to hear Carpenter in its next term.12 
Although the police regularly collect CSLI without a warrant, and 
no apparent circuit split exists that would require Supreme Court 
review, the issue is ripe for certiorari. Major cell providers’ growing 
unwillingness to cooperate with law enforcement, even with court or-
ders or warrants—likely due to public pressure and uncertainty in the 
law13 —has caused law enforcement to engage in self-help to obtain 
the information themselves. United States law enforcement agencies 
also use devices capable of collecting CSLI in real-time. These devices 
are most often referred to as an IMSI-catcher, “StingRay,” or 
“TriggerFish.” Circuit courts disagree about whether cell phone users 
have a reasonable expecation of privacy in their CSLI if law enforce-
ment collects the data rather than cell phone service providers. 
Whichever way the Supreme Court decides Carpenter, the Court’s 
ruling—no matter how narrow—will affect how law enforcement must 
treat collection of CSLI. 
Just as cell phones have become ubiquitous with modern day life, 
so has a certain relinquishment of privacy. This Comment argues that 
the Court’s analysis of the Fourth Amendment’s intersection with 
modern technology should distinguish between the communications’ 
content and metadata such as CSLI because CSLI does not protect 
the user’s reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Part I explains the underlying technology that allows cell phones 
to interact with cell towers and discusses the differences between his-
torical cell-site location information that cell service providers keep in 
the regular course of business and prospective cell-site location 
information. Part II then provides a brief history of United States law 
enforcement’s use of IMSI-catchers and the technology that enables 
their use. Part III discusses the statutes under which law enforcement 
has authority to gather historical and prospective cell-site location in-
formation from cell service providers and to utilize their own IMSI-
catchers. Part III explains state and federal laws that have been en-
 
11. Id. at 885–90. 
12. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. 
Ct. 2211 (2017). 
13. See, e.g., David Kravetz, AT&T Demands Clarity: Are Warrants Needed for 
Customer Cell-Site Data?, ARS Techncia (Nov. 18, 2014, 9:10 AM), 
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/11/att-demands-clarity-are-warrants-
needed-for-customer-cell-site-data/ [https://perma.cc/F49M-EN3Z] (explaining 
AT&T’s confusion and frustration regarding the requirements to release user’s 
data to law enforcement). 
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acted specifically to address government use of IMSI-catchers. Part IV 
summarizes the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment precedent rel-
evant to cell-site tracking and illustrates how Circuit courts have 
applied it in the context of historical and prospective CSLI and the 
use of IMSI-Catchers. Finally, Part V analyzes the Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence as applied to IMSI-Catchers and concludes that 
cell phone users do not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
their cell-site location information. 
I. The Basics of Cellular Technology, CSLI, and 
IMSI-Catchers. 
Collection of CSLI can be separated into three categories: (1) 
historical CSLI, such as the stored information obtained from cell 
service providers in Carpenter; (2) prospective CSLI, that is, the 
collection of CSLI in real-time from a cell service provider; and (3) 
prospective CSLI obtained by use of an IMSI-catcher. To understand 
the privacy implications pertaining to each category, it is essential to 
understand cellular technology and how the information is obtained 
by service providers and law enforcement. 
A. Historical Cell-Site Location Information. 
Wireless cell phone service operates through radio signaling, in 
which the cell phone device communicates with antenna towers oper-
ated by a service provider.14 Each cell phone service provider has its 
own infrastructure of radio base stations, also referred to as “cell 
sites,” throughout its geographical coverage area.15 These cell sites 
have antennas that detect radio signals from cellular phones to create 
a connection to the cellular network.16 A cell site typically contains 
three antennas that point in opposite directions 120 degrees apart,17 
splitting the cell site into three pie-slice shaped “sectors.” As long as 
the cellular telephone is powered on, it automatically searches for cell 
 
14. Elec. Surveillance Unit, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Electronic 
Surveillance Manual: Procedures and Case Law Forms 178 n.41 
(2005), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal/legacy/2014/10/29/ 
elec-sur-manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/EB6Z-MFEH] [hereinafter DOJ 2005 
Manual]. 
15. ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based Technologies and 
Services: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and 
Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 20 (2010) 
[hereinafter ECPA Judiciary Hearing 2010] (statement of Professor Matt 
Blaze, University of Pennsylvania). 
16. Id. at 13. 
17. Judge Herbert B. Dixon Jr., Scientific Fact or Junk Science? Tracking a Cell 
Phone Without GPS, Judges’ J., Winter 2014, at 37, 37–38. 
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towers to connect to by sending out signals or “pings” to identify it-
self to nearby cell sites.18 The cellular phone typically connects to a 
sector facing the direction of the phone from the closest cell site with 
the strongest connection.19 When the cell phone reaches a cell-site 
sector and identifies itself, the cell site receives the cell phone’s mobile 
electronic serial number (ESN),20 international mobile subscriber iden-
tity number (IMSI),21 and international mobile station equipment 
identity number (IMEI).22 This process is termed “registration.”23 
Cellular phones ping cell towers roughly every seven seconds.24 A 
cellular device often receives a signal from more than one antenna25 
and, if needed, the cellular device can reconnect to one of the addi-
tional six sectors.26 The pings identify which cell-site sector can 
provide the strongest connection for the device.27 Although a cellular 
device may register with more than one cell-site sector, the cellular 
device “camps” on the sector providing the strongest signal.28 This 
process is essential for a cell phone to make and receive calls. When a 
cell phone is idle and receives a page from another cell phone attempt-
ing to connect, it responds by paging whichever cell-site sector it is 
camped on, and the call is then placed upon that sector.29 
Whenever the user places or receives a call, the cell phone 
provider receives this information from its network and records where 
 
18. DOJ 2005 Manual, supra note 14, at 178 n.41. 
19. Dixon, supra note 17, at 38. 
20. An ESN is a unique identifier for each actual cellular telephone device. DOJ 
2005 Manual, supra note 14, at 177 n.36. 
21. An IMSI is a unique identifier for the SIM card inside of the cellular telephone 
device. Id. at 177 n.37. 
22. Id. All SIM-card based cell phones contain an IMEI number that remains the 
same even if the SIM card is removed. See Mir Ubaid, Can You Hear Me 
Now? How Police Track Your Cell Phone, Tom’s Guide (Oct. 14, 2015, 9:38 
AM), https://www.tomsguide.com/us/cellphone-tracker-stingray,news-21718. 
html [https://perma.cc/VF3K-SJU8]. 
23. Kevin McLaughlin, Note, The Fourth Amendment and Cell Phone Location 
Tracking: Where Are We?, 29 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 421, 426 
(2007). 
24. Id. 
25. Dixon, supra note 17, at 38. 
26. See Transcript of Record at 9, United States v. Sims, No. 2:07-cr-00298 (E.D. 
Pa. Nov. 13, 2007) (testimony of William Shute). 
27. Id. 
28. Heath Hardman, The Brave New World of Cell-Site Simulators, 8 Alb. 
Gov’t L. Rev. 1, 18 (2015). 
29. Transcript of Record, supra note 26, at 9. 
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the cell tower is located and which of the three sectors covered by 
that tower is serving the user’s phone.30 This information is known as 
historical CSLI. The type of information recorded includes: the per-
sonal telephone number, date, time the call was initiated, duration of 
the call, whether the call was inbound or outbound, and the cell 
site(s) and sector(s) to which the phone was connected when the call 
was initiated and terminated.31 The cell-site sector in which a call is 
terminated is often not the same cell-site sector in which the call was 
made. This is because the cell device searches for the strongest con-
nection while the user is on the phone, and it switches from one cell 
site to another without any interruption to the phone call or notice to 
either party on the call.32 Service providers retain historical CSLI for 
various amounts of time, typically from one to two years.33 
A particular cell-site sector to which a user is connected does not 
necessarily provide an accurate description of where the phone is 
located. Historical CSLI can be useful to locate a cell phone within a 
general area or, in particular, to reveal the direction someone is trav-
eling over long distances as they repeatedly switch towers in a 
particular direction.34 A cell device does not always connect to the 
closest cell tower relative to its location. Cell phone signals “are in a 
frequency range that travels in a straight line and has limited penetra-
tion capabilities.”35 Therefore, structures such as buildings and tunnels 
can prevent a cell phone from connecting to a nearby tower.36 The size 
of the cell-site sector’s geographical coverage also plays a role in how 
precisely CSLI can determine a cell phone’s location.37 In more heavily 
 
30. See ECPA Judiciary Hearing 2010, supra note 15, at 13–14 (testimony of 
Professor Matt Blaze, University of Pennsylvania) (explaining how phone 
companies know where to route incoming phone calls). 
31. Transcript of Record, supra note 26, at 15, 19. 
32. Id. at 11. 
33. See Patrick Siewert, Cellular Provider Record Retention Periods, Forensic 
Focus (April 18, 2017), https://articles.forensicfocus.com/2017/04/18/ 
cellular-provider-record-retention-periods/ [https://perma.cc/R8NJ-9D3H]. 
34. Mike Masnick, Turns Out Cell Phone Location Data Is Not Even Close to 
Accurate, but Everyone Falls for It, TechDirt (Sept. 9, 2014, 7:56 AM) 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140908/04435128452/turns-out-cell-
phone-location-data-is-not-even-close-to-accurate-everyone-falls-it.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/WU9N-J84X]. 
35. Bert Markgraf, How Far Can a Cell Tower Be For a Cell Phone to Pick Up 
the Signal?, Chron, http://smallbusiness.chron.com/far-can-cell-tower-
cellphone-pick-up-signal-32124.html [https://perma.cc/5ZW3-G4QW] (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2017). 
36. Id.; Dixon, supra note 17, at 38. 
37. ECPA Judiciary Hearing 2010, supra note 15, at 23-24 (Statement of Professor 
Matt Blaze, University of Pennsylvania).  
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populated areas in which more cell coverage is needed, coverage typi-
cally extends a few blocks.38 In rural areas, however, cell-site coverage 
can vary from a quarter of a mile to several miles.39 Due to the 
growing popularity of cell phone use in recent years, the number of 
cell sites has increased, and the size of cell-site sectors has steadily 
decreased.40 In turn, the accuracy of historical CSLI relative to the 
cellular phones actual location will increase as service providers pro-
vide better coverage.41 
B. Prospective Cell-Site Location Information 
Cell phone service providers can also actively collect user’s CSLI 
in “real-time.” This is known as prospective CSLI. In doing so, pro-
viders “ping” the cell phone and locate the nearest cell site to the 
cellular device at any time the phone is powered on.42 Service provid-
ers can also obtain a much more accurate prediction of a cell phone’s 
location by triangulation. Triangulation pinpoints the cell phone’s lo-
cation by: 
[C]omputing the distance between the cell device and three 
antennas based on the time delay of the signal between the 
device and each antenna, and drawing a circle around each 
tower, with each circle having a radius of the phone’s distance 
from that tower. The circles will intersect to pinpoint the 
location of the phone.43  
 
38. Tim De Chant, Why Your Cell Phone Drops Calls in Dense Cities, CityLab 
(Sept. 23, 2011) https://www.citylab.com/life/2011/09/cell-phones-anddensity/ 
 172/[https://perma.cc/DN8P-XBPY]. 
39. See Chris Silver Smith, Cell Phone Triangulation Accuracy Is All Over the Map, 
Search Engine Land (Sept. 22, 2008, 4:59 PM), http:// 
searchengineland.com/cell-phone-triangulation-accuracy-is-all-over-the-map-14790 
[https://perma.cc/DVC8-G5KY]. 
40. ECPA Judiciary Hearing 2010, supra note 15, at 24–25 (Statement of Professor 
Matt Blaze, University of Pennsylvania). See also Wireless Snapshot 2017, 
CTIA, https://www.ctia.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/ctia-
wireless-snapshot.pdf [https://perma.cc/35G4-VUQJ] (last visited Oct. 4, 2017) 
(“At the end of 2016, a record 308,334 cell sites were in operation, representing 
growth of over 57 percent in the last ten years.”). 
41. Dixon, supra note 17, at 39. 
42. Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: Toward 
Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data That 
Congress Could Enact, 27 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 117, 131 (2012). 
43. See Dixon, supra note 17, at 38. 
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In other words, triangulation creates a Venn diagram of three cell 
sites to which the cell phone has connected, and the overlap of the 
diagram is the area the cellular device is likely located. 
Triangulated cell-site data is generally only available prospectively 
because cell service providers typically do not routinely record the 
data.44 However, cell service providers can utilize triangulation to lo-
cate the source of incoming 911 calls.45 The Federal Communications 
Commission requires cell service providers to maintain the ability to 
locate, with certain accuracy, the location of any cell phone that 
makes a 911 call within their network.46 Otherwise, cell service pro-
viders typically do not store triangulated data as historical CSLI. 
II. IMSI-Catchers. 
An IMSI-catcher is a device used by law enforcement that 
simulates the signals emitted by cell towers in order to enable a target 
cell phone to register with it.47 The target cell phone is unable to 
distinguish the device from authentic cell service provider infrastruc-
ture.48 This allows the device to “catch” the same type of data that a 
normal cell tower receives from cell phones upon registration.  
The capabilities of IMSI-catchers and to what exent they are 
utilized in practice by law enforcement in the United States was once 
unclear. Government use of IMSI-catchers and other cell phone sur-
veillance technology had been deliberatly concealed. In recent years, 
due to pressure from interested parties, the U.S. Department of 
Justice has announced its policy on the federal government’s use of 
StingRay devices, and the overall transparency of IMSI-Catcher use 
has improved on the federal, state, and local levels. 
 
44. See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 42, at 128. 
45. Id. 
46. See 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(h) (2014) (setting location accuracy and reliability 
standards for cell phone calls within certain areas). 
47. See Brian L. Owsley, TriggerFish, StingRays, and Fourth Amendment Fishing 
Expeditions, 66 Hastings L.J. 183, 183, 185 (2014) (“Cell site simulators are 
an electronic surveillance device that mimics a cell tower causing all nearby 
cell phones to register their data and information with the cell site simulator. 
Law enforcement increasingly relies on these devices during the course of 
routine criminal investigations.”). 
48. Id. at 192. IMSI-catchers take advantage of cell phone devices operating on 
2G connections because they do not require authentication of cell sites to 
register with them. Ubaid, supra note 22. IMSI-catchers are also capable of 
forcing 3G and 4G connections to temporarily downgrade to 2G to avoid 
authentication. Id. It is believed that newer models of IMSI-catchers can 
directly register with cell phones operating on a 4G network without 
downgrading the connection to 2G. Id. 
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A. Origins—The Birth of the StingRay. 
The United States originally developed cellular surveillance 
technology for military surveillance purposes.49 Law enforcement 
followed suit and began using the devices in the early 1990s.50 
Originally, U.S. agencies utilized the technology to test cellular 
phones.51 But soon enough, cellular equipment manufacturers devel-
oped and sold cellular surveillance products specifically for govern-
ment surveillance use.52 By 1991, Harris Corporation, the leading 
manufacturer for cell phone surveillance technology in the United 
States, began marketing its products to the general law enforcement 
community.53 
Today, United States federal law enforcement uses IMSI-catchers 
which are manufactured by Harris Corporation and marketed under 
the name “StingRay.”54 IMSI-catchers have become colloquially re-
ferred to as StingRay devices when referring to United States law 
enforcement’s use of them. Other common names used to describe 
StingRay devices or IMSI-catchers include Kingfish, TriggerFish, 
Amberjack, or Hailstorm, among others.55 However, these terms orig-
inate from different surveillance products manufactured by the Harris 
 
49. John Kelly, Cellphone Data Spying: It’s Not Just the NSA, USA TODAY, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/12/08/cellphone-data-
spying-nsapolice/3902809/ [https://perma.cc/FU9X-SN8U] (last visited Sept. 
27, 2017). 
50. Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Your Secret StingRay’s No Secret 
Anymore: The Vanishing Government Monopoly over Cell Phone Surveillance 
and Its Impact on National Security and Consumer Privacy, 28 Harv. J.L. 
& Tech. 1, 14 (2014). 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. See, e.g., Glen L. Roberts, Who’s on the Line? Cellular Phone Interception at 
Its Best, http://gbppr.dyndns.org/~gbpprorg/2600/harris.txt [https://perma. 
cc/83QE-99GZ] (last visited Sept. 27, 2017) (“[T]he cellular phone monitoring 
equipment is sold only to the law enforcement market.”). 
54. See Ryan Gallagher, Meet the Machines that Steal Your Phone’s Data, ARS 
Technica (Sept. 25, 2013, 1:00 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2013/09/meet-the-machines-that-steal-your-phones-data/2/ [https:// 
perma.cc/K4DZ-5CVQ] (explaining that Harris Corporation manufactures 
StingRay devices and keeps a “code of silence” to attempt to deter others from 
creating similar devices and that records show exclusive dealings between Harris 
Corp. and government agencies). 
55. Id.; United States v. Lambdis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“A 
cell-site simulator” is “sometimes referred to as a ‘StingRay,’ ‘Hailstorm,’ or 
‘TriggerFish.’”).  
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Corporation.56 Although these devices may possess similar capabilities 
to that of an IMSI-catcher or StingRay, in the sense that they can 
track locations of cellular phones, the technology behind the devices is 
dissimilar.57 
Although federal law enforcement once used Harris’ TriggerFish 
device, the device no longer appears to be manufactured.58 In 1995, 
FBI agents used a TriggerFish to locate infamous computer hacker, 
Kevin Mitnick.59 The TriggerFish simulated a cell site in order to 
locate Mitnick’s phone.60 Although the TriggerFish device had the 
same capabilities as a StingRay device, the extent of the device’s cap-
abilities is unclear. The product was originally marketed in 1991 as a 
type of wireless wiretap device capable of eavesdropping on phone 
calls,61 but it is unknown whether law enforcement used the device for 
this purpose. Nonetheless, this benchmark helps predict how long law 
enforcement has been utilizing this type of cell phone surveillance 
technology. 
It is unclear when the StingRay device was introduced to the 
market, but the U.S. Trademark Office lists the device as registered in 
2003.62 The public learned of the government’s use of StingRay de-
vices for the first time in 2012 as a result of United States v. 
Rigmaiden,63 the first case to question use of the device. In 
Rigmaiden, the defendant participated in a scheme to obtain fraud-
ulent tax refunds.64 Rigmaiden used an aircard under a false identity 
to perpetrate his fraudulent activity.65 Law enforcement used a 
StingRay device to locate the aircard and, subsequently, Rigmaiden’s 
 
56. See Gallagher, supra note 54 (listing technology produced by Harris). I used 
TriggerFish in the title of this Comment solely for pun purposes; all the 
StingRay puns were taken. See, e.g., Jason Norman, Note, Taking the Sting 
out of the Stingray: The Dangers of Cell-Site Simulator Use and the Role of 
the Federal Communications Commission in Protecting Privacy & Security, 
68 Fed. Comm. L.J. 139 (2016). 
57. Id. 
58. See id. (noting that trademark records show that registration for the 
TriggerFish was filed in July 2001, but the trademark was cancelled in 2008 
and Harris Corporation does not market the product). 
59. Pell & Soghoian, supra note 50, at 14. 
60. Id. 
61. See Roberts, supra note 53; Gallagher, supra note 54. 
62. STINGRAY, Registration No. 2,762,468. 
63. 844 F. Supp. 2d 982 (D. Ariz. 2012). 
64. Id. at 987. 
65. Id. 
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location in an apartment.66 This case attracted the public’s and the 
media’s attention because the government went to great lengths to 
conceal that they had used a StingRay and would not reveal how the 
technology worked.67 This case led to the discovery that Harris 
Corporation and government agencies deliberately concealed the use 
of StingRay devices.68 The level of secrecy surrounding government 
use of IMSI-catchers has understandibly increased judicial, legislative, 
and public scrutiny. As a result, pressure from privacy advocates, 
filing of Freedom of Information Act requests,69 and action by influ-
ential Senate and House members70 has caused the government to 
reveal details about StingRay use and specifications. 
B. The Secrecy Behind the Use of IMSI-Catchers. 
Both the Harris Corporation and the FBI have shielded the tech-
nology behind StingRay devices. Harris does not disclose details about 
StingRay devices on its website, and includes a warning with its mar-
keting materials that they should only be distributed to the law 
 
66. See Order at 4–5, United States v. Rigmaiden, 844 F. Supp. 2d 982 (D. Ariz. 
2012) (No. CR 08-814-PHX-DGC), 2013 WL 1932800, at *3. “Using the cell-
tower information, a map, and various calculations, a government agent was 
able to narrow” the general location of a Rigmaiden’s aircard. The 
government then obtained an order and a “warrant authorizing the use of a 
mobile tracking device to communicate with the aircard,” which tracked the 
aircard to an apartment. Id. 
67. Linda Lye, In Court: Uncovering Stingrays, A Troubling New Location 
Tracking Device, ACLU (Oct. 22, 2012, 12:45 PM), https://www. 
aclu.org/blog/court-uncovering-stingrays-troubling-new-location-tracking-
device [https://perma.cc/WR5L-QXAH] (“[T]he government hid from the 
judge the facts that stingrays collect information about third parties, that 
they can pinpoint targets even within their homes, and that some models 
capture content, not just location.”). 
68. Id. (“[T]he papers the government submitted to get the so-called ‘warrant’ 
never told the judge that the government wanted to use a stingray (or IMSI 
catcher, or cell site emulator), what the device is, or how it works.”).  
69. See, e.g., Nathan Freed Wessler, ICE Using Powerful Stingray Surveillance 
Devices in Deportation Searches, ACLU (May 23, 2017, 10:15 AM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/ice-
using-powerful-stingray-surveillance-devices [https://perma.cc/3AY7-ML9E]. 
70. See Stingrays: A New Frontier in Police Surveillance Panel 1, CATO 
Institute (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.cato.org/multimedia/events/ 
stingrays-new-frontier-police-surveillance-panel-1 [https://perma.cc/7RJ4-
JFCM] (discussing efforts by the House Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform to introduce legislation limiting government use of cell 
phone surveillance technology). 
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enforcement and communications service providers authorized under 
18 U.S.C. § 2512.71 
The FBI and Harris Corporation are bound by a non-disclosure 
agreement that restricts discussion regarding StingRay technology.72 
Local law enforcement is bound by the same non-disclosure agreement 
if they wish to acquire a StingRay device. The FCC requires local law 
enforcement to coordinate with the FBI before acquiring a StingRay.73 
The FBI then requires the local agency to sign a non-disclosure 
agreement before acquiring a StingRay.74 The FBI revealed an ex-
ample of the non-disclosure agreement in a letter to the Baltimore 
Police Department.75 The agreement restricts the Baltimore Police 
Department and the Office of the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City 
from discussing the device or its capabilities in any court proceeding.76 
It also requires that the police notify the FBI immediately upon any 
court order requesting sensitive information pertaining to StingRay 
devices.77 
These non-disclosure agreements have caused police departments 
to not only keep quiet about the capabilities of StingRays, but also to 
not disclose the use of the device at all.78 This agreement forced the 
 
71. Only law enforcement and communication service providers may lawfully 
manufacture, assemble, possess, distribute, and advertise wire, oral, or electronic 
communication intercepting devices. 18 U.S.C. § 2512 (2012); Harris Assured 
Commc’ns, Hardware Manual 3 (2010), https://cryptome.org/2015/03/fcc-
stingray-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/VH9K-4PU7]. 
72. See, e.g., Letter from Ernest Reith, Acting Assistant Dir., FBI, to Frederick H. 
Bealefeld, III, Police Comm’r, Balt. Police Dep’t & Gregg L. Bernstein, Esq., 
State’s Attorney, Office of the State’s Attorney for Balt. City (July 13, 2011), 
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1808819/baltimore-police-stingray-non-
disclosure-agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7VW-7SGA] (specifying the non-
disclosure requirements between the Baltimore Police Department, Office of the 
Baltimore State’s Attorney, and the FBI regarding Harris Corporation tracking 
devices). 
73. Tim Cushing, FCC Denies It Requires Law Enforcement to Sign a Non-
Disclosure Agreement with the FBI Before Deploying Stingray Devices, 
TechDirt (Oct. 10, 2014, 1:33 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/ 
20141008/13471728772/fcc-denies-it-requireslaw-enforcement-to-sign-non-
disclosure-agreement-with-fbi-before-deploying-stingraydevices.Shtml [https:// 
perma.cc/64UN-C32J]. 
74. See id. (assuming that FBI requires local law enforcement to sign a non-
disclosure agreement based on an FBI agent’s comments). 
75. See Letter from Ernest Reith to Frederick H. Bealefeld, III, and Gregg L. 
Bernstein, supra note 72. 
76. Id.  
77. Id. 
78. See, e.g., Kim Zetter, Florida Cops’ Secret Weapon: Warrantless Cell Phone 
Tracking, Wired (Mar. 3, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/ 
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government’s lack of transparency in the Rigmaiden case.79 Fear of 
disclosure has also caused local and federal law enforcement to dismiss 
charges in lieu of revealing sensitive information that may violate the 
agreement.80 
The federal government currently owns hundreds of StingRay 
devices and has spent over 100 million dollars on the devices.81 The 
Department of Homeland Security has given $1.8 million in grants to 
local law enforcement agencies to purchase StingRay devices.82 
However, it is unknown exactly how many local law enforcement 
agencies own StingRay devices. According to the American Civil 
Liberties Union, “72 agencies in 24 states and the District of 
Columbia” own StingRay devices.83 But this number dramatically un-
derrepresents actual use among state and local law enforcement.84 
C. Technology of IMSI-catchers. 
IMSI-catchers contain “an antenna, a computer with mapping 
software, and a special device.”85 The device is about the size of a 
briefcase and can be set up virtually anywhere.86 Although the range 
is unclear, the Department of Justice claims their IMSI-catchers are 
typically deployed within 1,000 feet of the subject phone.87 Since cell 
 
03/stingray/ [https://perma.cc/Z3PP-TH5L] (reporting on a Florida police 
department that did not disclose use of a StingRay to the court over two 
hundred times). 
79. See supra Section II.A.  
80. See Jason M. Weinstein et al., Privacy vs. Public Safety: Prosecuting and 
Defending Criminal Cases in the Post-Snowden Era, 52 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 
729, 742 (2015) (“Local prosecutors have gone so far as to make favorable plea 
deals or even to dismiss cases altogether in order to avoid disclosing 
information about the use of this technique.”). 
81. Stingrays: A New Frontier in Police Surveillance Panel 1, supra note 70, at 
7:00. 
82. Id. at 17:45. 
83. Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them?, ACLU, https://www.aclu. 
org/issues/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/stingray-tracking-
devices-whos-got-them [https://perma.cc/5CP3-HZDP] (last visited Sept. 19, 
2017). 
84. Id. 
85. Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, How ‘Stingray’ Devices Work, Wall St. J. 
(Sept. 21, 2011, 10:33 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2011/09/21/how-
stingray-devices-work/ [https://perma.cc/23N3-R2KR]. 
86. See, e.g., Gallagher, supra note 54. 
87. Examining Law Enforcement Use of Cell Phone Tracking Devices: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on the Info. Tech. of the H. Comm. on Oversight & 
Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. 12 (2015) (statement of Seth Stodder, Assistant 
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phones give preference to the cell site with the strongest signal, an 
IMSI-catcher only needs to emit the strongest signal in an area near 
the target cell phone to successfully register with the phone.88 If law 
enforcement knows the unique hardware numbers attached to the 
phone, such as the IMSI number, they can travel with the IMSI-
catcher until it registers with the correct cell phone.89 Law enforce-
ment also uses the device to find out which cell phones are located 
within a specific area.90 In this case, law enforcement points the 
antenna in the target direction and will receive identifying infor-
mation from all of the cell phones in the area that successfully register 
with the device.91 
IMSI-catchers are also capable of identifying more precise loca-
tions of target cell phones once an initial connection is made.92 Law 
enforcement can move to different locations around the target area, 
and the IMSI-catcher can measure the signal strength from each 
location to triangulate the location of the target cell phone more pre-
cisely.93 This process is essentially the same as triangulation done by 
prospective CSLI collection directly from cell service providers, except 
that the device is portable and measures one data point at a time, 
rather than three or more at once. 
There are two distinct aspects of StingRay capabilities that seem 
to garner the most misunderstanding. First, StingRay devices are cap-
able of capturing the content of communications. However, it is 
important to realize that the StingRay devices used by law enforce-
ment in the United States must be configured as pen registers—which 
do not capture the content of communications—because law enforce-
ment acquires its authority to use the devices from the Pen/Trap 
statute.94 Therefore, the StingRays are configured to not capture the 
content of any communication. In addition, StingRay devices are not 
capable of capturing subscriber information from the target cell phone 
regardless of the limitations of the Pen/Trap Statute.95 Second, 
StingRay devices by their nature, attract all cell phones nearby to 
 
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security) [hereinafter Tracking 
Devices House Hearing 2015]. 
88. Ubaid, supra note 22. 
89. See Valentino-DeVries, supra note 85. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. See infra Sections III.B–C.  
95. Tracking Devices House Hearing 2015, supra note 87, at 12. 
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connect to them—not just the target cell phone. This creates the 
concern that StingRay devices collect information from innocent 
third-party bystanders. The Department of Justice has addressed this 
issue as well. In 2002, the Department of Justice issued a policy docu-
ment titled “Avoiding Collection and Investigative Use of ‘Content’ in 
the Operation of Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices.”96 
Furthermore, in 2015, the Department of Justice specifically ad-
dressed overcollection concerns in its policy statement regarding use of 
StingRay devices.97 The policy requires agencies to implement an au-
diting system to manage and dispose of data from third parties.98 
III. The Legal Standard Needed to Obtain CSLI. 
The government has derived statutory authority to obtain CSLI 
from the Pen/Trap Statute99 and the Stored Communications Act 
(“SCA”),100 both within the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
of 1986 (“ECPA”).101 The ECPA has been frequently updated and 
amended to keep up with advancing technology,102 and the Pen/Trap 
Statute is a prime example of that. 
A. Statutory Authority for Historical CSLI. 
Prosecutors have derived statutory authority to obtain historical 
CSLI from the SCA.103 The SCA allows a governmental entity to 
“require a provider of electronic communication service or remote 
computing service to disclose a record or other information pertaining 
to a subscriber to or customer of such service.”104 The SCA grants the 
 
96. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the 
Deputy Att’y Gen., Avoiding Collection and Investigative Use of “Content” in 
the Operation of Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices (May 24, 2002), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2007/10/09/memo-052 
42002.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5KY-KNWE]. 
97. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Policy Guidance: 
Use of Cell-Site Simulator Technology (Sept. 3, 2015), http:// 
www.justice.gov/opa/file/767321/download [https://perma.cc/WN2R-E3RX] 
[hereinafter DOJ 2015 Policy]; see infra Section III.C. 
98. DOJ 2015 Policy, supra note 97, at 6. 
99. 18 U.S.C. § 3121–27 (2012).  
100. Id. §§ 2701–12. 
101. Pub. L. No. 99–508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2510–22 (2012)). 
102. McLaughlin, supra note 23, at 428. 
103. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703–12; ECPA Judiciary Hearing 2010, supra note 15, at 70 
(written statement of Marc J. Zwillinger, Zwillinger Genetski, LLP). 
104. § 2703(c). 
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government authority to obtain all records from a cell service provider 
other than those that contain contents of communications, which the 
SCA defines as “any information concerning the substance, purport, 
or meaning of [a] communication.”105 Location data is not categorized 
as the content of a communication, “rather it is ancillary data 
conveyed so that the wireless telephone can connect with the nearest 
cell tower.”106 Records requests pursuant to the SCA require proof of 
“specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic commun-
ication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and 
material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”107 
Records requests under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) are a common 
occurrence.108 The amount of record requests made under the SCA has 
increased dramatically in recent years.109 Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell 
of the U.S. District Court for the Disctict of Colombia recently 
released summary data that revealed how often requests under 18 
U.S.C. § 2703(d) have been made in criminal cases handled by the 
Justice Department or the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of 
Columbia since 2008. The records showed that the requests have in-
creased sevenfold since 2014 in the District of Colombia alone.110 
B. Statutory Authority for Prospective CSLI 
The statutory standard utilized to request prospective CSLI from 
cell service providers and to receive court authorization to utilize a 
StingRay device is much more controversial and complicated than re-
quests for historical CSLI. The language of the SCA alone is not 
sufficient to enable the government to retrieve data in real time. In 
 
105. Id. § 2510(8). 
106. ECPA Judiciary Hearing 2010, supra note 15, at 70 (written statement of 
Marc J. Zwillinger, Zwillinger Genetski, LLP). 
107. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 
108. See, e.g., Verizon’s Transparency Report for the First Half of 2015, 
Verizon, https://www.verizon.com/about/portal/transparency-report/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/Verizon-Transparency-Report-2015-first-half.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/4CCS-LLMC] (stating that Verizon Wireless received 149,810 
requests for customer data in the first half of 2015). 
109. Spencer S. Hsu, Court: Warrantless Requests to Track Cellphones, Internet 
Use Grew Sevenfold in D.C. in Three Years, Wash. Post (July 18, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/court-warrantless-requests-
to-track-cellphones-internet-use-grew-sevenfold-in-dc-in-three-years/2017/07/18/ 
b284ac32-6b36-11e7-9c15-177740635e83_story.html?utm_term=.15cb8cb8959a 
[https://perma.cc/86Y7-6PJS]. 
110. Id. (noting that this number includes requests for an individuals’ Internet 
connection records in addition to cell phone tower records). 
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2005, the Department of Justice created a type of “hybrid order” to 
establish legal authority to retreive prospective CSLI.111 The order ad-
vised that the government should request prospective CSLI under 
both the Pen/Trap statute112 and the section 2703(d) of the SCA.113 
Congress enacted the Pen/Trap statute in response to the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Smith v. Maryland114 to establish 
procedural requirements for law enforcement’s use of pen registers or 
trap and trace devices. The statute authorized law enforcement to 
install the devices with a court order. Fifteen years later, the USA 
PATRIOT Act115 amended the definition of a pen register to include 
any device that collects “dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling 
information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a 
wire or electronic communication is transmitted,”116 and amended the 
definition of “trap and trace device” to include any device that 
collects “dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information 
reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic 
communication.”117 Under the Pen/Trap statute, the applicants must 
only identity themselves and their agency118 and certify that “the in-
formation likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal 
investigation being conducted by that agency.”119 If this relatively low 
burden is met, then the court is required to authorize the installation 
of the pen/trap device.120 On its face, the Pen/Trap statute would 
seem to permit law enforcement to retrieve prospective CSLI from cell 
service providers.121 However, the Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act (“CALEA”),122 passed in 1994, includes a provision 
that limits the type of information that law enforcement can obtain 
pursuant to the Pen/Trap statute. It states that, “with regard to 
 
111. Pell & Soghoian, supra note 42, at 135–136. 
112. 18 U.S.C. § 3122 (2012). 
113. Id. § 2703(d). 
114. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
115. Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 
3127(3) (2012)). 
116. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2012). 
117. Id. § 3127(4). 
118. Id. § 3122(b)(1). 
119. Id. § 3122(b)(2). 
120. Id. § 3123(a). 
121. ECPA Judiciary Hearing 2010, supra note 15, at 71 (written statement of 
Marc J. Zwillinger, Zwillinger Genetski, LLP). 
122. Pub. L. No. 103–414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–
1010 (2012)). 
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information acquired solely pursuant to the authority of the pen reg-
isters and trap and trace devices . . . such call-identifying information 
shall not include any information that may disclose the physical 
location of the subscriber.”123 With this limitation, law enforcement 
would not have authority to request prospective CSLI because it may 
disclose the physical location. 
The government has relied on the fact that CALEA states 
information that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber 
cannot be acquired solely by use of a Pen/Trap Statute.124 This lan-
guage suggests that another statute could be utilized to grant 
authority to the government to gather CSLI information. By combin-
ing the Pen/Trap Statute and § 2703 of the SCA, the Department of 
Justice effectively benefits from the language of the Pen/Trap Statute 
that states that the court shall125 issue an ex parte order rather than 
the language in the SCA that states a court may issue an order.126 At 
the same time, the Department of Justice overcomes the “solely” 
language in the statute by relying on section 2703(d) of the SCA that 
permits law enforcement to use a court order to obtain all non-
content subscriber information.127 The combination of the statutes also 
helps overcome arguments that suggest that cell phones are “tracking 
devices” under 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) and therefore, not an “electronic 
communication” under the Pen/Trap statute, because the SCA does 
not exclude tracking devices from the types of information that may 
be provided, nor does it exclude location information. 
C. IMSI-Catchers and the Law. 
Law enforcement derives statutory authority to operate IMSI-
catchers by utilizing the same “hybrid order” used for obtaining pro-
spective CSLI. Although, the Department of Justice noted in 2005 
that the prohibition in CALEA limiting the ability to disclose location 
information only applies to cell service providers because, “[b]y its 
very terms, this prohibition applies only to information collected by a 
pro-vider and not to information collected directly by law enforcement 
authorities. Thus, CALEA does not bar the use of pen/trap orders to 
authorize the use of cell phone tracking devices used to locate 
 
123. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2). 
124. Id. 
125. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a). 
126. Id. § 2703(d). 
127. Under this theory, the government must still meet the higher judicial showing 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). ECPA Judiciary Hearing 2010, supra note 15, at 
72 (statement of Marc J. Zwillinger, Zwillinger Genetski, LLP). 
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targeted cell phones.”128 Therefore, the federal government’s position 
was that the Pen/Trap Statute was the “safest method of allowing 
law enforcement to collect [CSLI] directly using its own devices.”129 
In 2015, the Department of Justice changed its policy for utilizing 
StingRay devices.130 The change was due to challenges by media and 
nonprofit organizations,131 as well as influence from legislative bod-
ies.132 The new policy requires a warrant pursuant to Rule 41 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure—or the relevant state 
equilvalent—in addition to authorization from the Pen/Trap Statute 
to obtain authorization to utilize a cell-site simulator.133 The policy 
also requires agencies to comply with certain training, auditing, and 
management controls.134 The Department of Justice emphasized again 
that because cell-site simulators used by the Department must be 
configured like pen registers to obtain authorization from the statute, 
the devices do not collect the contents of any communication.135 
However, the policy only applies to federal agencies, leaving state and 
local law enforcement with discretion to enact their own policies. 
At least nine states have enacted laws that regulate the use of 
cell-site simulators,136 and at least five have required a warrant to use 
a cell-site simulator, including California,137 Minnesota,138 Utah,139 
Virginia,140 and Washington.141 Although the federal government no 
 
128. DOJ 2005 Manual, supra note 14, at 48. 
129. Id. 
130. See DOJ 2015 Policy, supra note 97. 
131. Shawn Marie Boyne, Stingray Technology, the Exclusionary Rule, and the 
Future of Privacy: A Cautionary Tale, 119 W. Va. L. Rev. 915, 928–29 
(2017). 
132. See Stingrays: A New Frontier in Police Surveillance Panel 1, supra note 70. 
133. DOJ 2015 Policy, supra note 97, at 3. 
134. Id. at 2–3. 
135. Id. at 2. 
136. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-3-303.5(2) (2017); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 168/10 
(Supp. 2017); Ind. Code § 35-33-5-12(a) (2014); Me. Stat. tit. 16, § 648 
(2017); Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 1-203.1(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2016); 
Minn. Stat. §§ 626A.28(3)(d), 626A.42(2)(a) (2017); Mont. Code Ann. 
§ 46-5-110(1)(a) (2017); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-610(b) (2017); Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.373(2) (2017). 
137. Cal. Penal Code § 1546.1(b)(1) (2017). 
138. Minn. Stat. § 626A.28 (2017). 
139. Utah Code Ann. § 77-23c-102(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2017). 
140. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-70.3 (2017). 
141. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 9.73.260, 9.73.270 (2017). 
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longer utilizes hybrid orders or the Pen/Trap statute alone to obtain 
prospective CSLI, these statutes are still often utilized by the states 
to obtain CSLI and to authorize the use of StingRay devices. 
IV. The Fourth Amendment 
A. Evolution of the Fourth Amendment and Technology 
 The Fourth Amendment provides: 
[T]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.142 
To trigger protection under the Fourth Amendment, and thus 
require a warrant for a search, the search must be considered un-
reasonable.143 Historically, for an action to constitute a search within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement must have 
physically trespassed.144 In Olmstead, the Supreme Court held that a 
wiretap did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment 
because law enforcement secured the evidence by hearing only, with-
out physical intrusion in to the defendant’s house or office.145 Nearly 
thirty years later, the Supreme Court deviated from the Olmstead 
trespass theory in a similar case.146 Katz involved placement of a 
listening device on a telephone booth that enabled law enforcement to 
hear calls the defendant made from inside the booth.147 The Supreme 
Court found that “[t]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not 
places,” and that what someone “seeks to preserve as private, even in 
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”148 
Katz became the seminal case to determine what constitutes a reason-
able expectation of privacy in the context of Fourth Amendment 
 
142. U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
143. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925). 
144. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928). 
145. Id. at 464. 
146. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (explaining “that the 
underpinnings of Olmstead . . . have been so eroded by our subsequent 
decisions that the ‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated can no longer be 
regarded as controlling”). 
147. Id. at 348. 
148. Id. at 351–52. 
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analysis. It established a two-prong test requiring: (1) that a person 
has an actual subjective expectation of privacy and (2) that the ex-
pectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.149 
The third-party doctrine effectively eliminates an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy—and thus, Fourth Amendment 
protection—in information voluntarily disclosed to a third party. The 
doctrine was first applied in cases involving government agents and 
undercover informants. In Hoffa v. United States,150 the Supreme 
Court held that law enforcement’s use of a government informant did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment when the defendant voluntarily 
invited the informant into his hotel room, even though the defendant 
did not know he was a government informant.151 The Court based its 
reasoning on the fact that Hoffa voluntarily assumed the risk that the 
third party might disclose the information he shared with the govern-
ment.152 The Court also held, in Lopez v. United States,153 that 
recorded statements made to an Internal Revenue Service Agent were 
not a search under the Fourth Amendment.154 
The Supreme Court later extended the third-party doctrine to 
include business records in United States v. Miller.155 In Miller, the 
government subpoenaed Miller’s banking records from his banking in-
stitution.156 The Supreme Court held that Miller did not have an 
expectation of privacy in his bank records.157  The Court reasoned 
that he could not claim ownership or possession of the records because 
they belong to the bank,158 and the documents “contain only infor-
mation voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their 
employees in the ordinary course of business.”159 Three years later, in 
Smith v. Maryland,160 the Supreme Court applied the third-party doc-
trine to a pen register.161 The Court determined that the installation 
 
149. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
150. 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
151. Id. at 302–03. 
152. Id. (quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963)). 
153. 373 U.S. 427 (1963). 
154. Id. at 439–40. 
155. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
156. Id. at 437–38. 
157. Id. at 442. 
158. Id. at 440. 
159. Id. at 442. 
160. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).  
161. Id. at 736. 
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of a pen register by a telephone company at the request of law 
enforcement was not a search because telephone users voluntarily 
convey the phone numbers they dial to phone companies.162 The Court 
emphasized that it was of no consequence that “most people may be 
oblivious to a pen register’s esoteric functions” because telephone 
users typically know that the information must be conveyed to tele-
phone companies to facilitate the call and the company records the 
information for a variety of legitimate business purposes.163 The hold-
ing in Smith also distinguished content and non-content information, 
noting that a pen register only collects information collected as a 
means of establishing communication, not the actual communication 
between the caller and the recipient of the call.164 
The Supreme Court first addressed surveillance in the context of 
the Fourth Amendment in companion cases, United States v. Knotts165 
and United States v. Karo166—two cases involving the use of an 
electronic beeper to track an individual’s movements. In Knotts, law 
enforcement placed a beeper inside a container of chloroform and 
tracked Knotts’s movements as he transported the jar.167 The Court 
held that Knotts did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
his movements out in public in plain view.168 Although the beeper en-
hanced law enforcement’s surveillance capabilities, normal visual 
surveillance could have achieved the same result.169 The Court in 
Karo, however, did not reach the same conclusion. In Karo, police 
also installed a beeper in a can of ether and tracked Karo’s move-
ments as he transported the can into his home and to two other 
homes.170 The Court held that the tracking of the beeper was an un-
reasonable search because the government obtained “information that 
it could not have obtained from outside the curtilage of the house.”171 
In Kyllo v. United States,172 the Court again addressed individuals’ 
expectation of privacy within the home as it pertains to sense-
 
162. Id. at 742. 
163. Id. at 742–43. 
164. Id. at 741. 
165. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
166. 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
167. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278. 
168. Id. at 281. 
169. Id. at 285 (Brennan, J., concurring).  
170. Karo, 468 U.S. at 708. 
171. Id. at 706. 
172. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
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enhancing technology.173 Law enforcement used a thermal imaging de-
vice from a street corner to detect high levels of heat emanating from 
the home.174 The police relied on this information in order to obtain a 
search warrant and subsequently found marijuana in the home.175 The 
Court held that use of a device not in general public use was an un-
reasonable search because it revealed information about the interior of 
the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without 
physical intrusion into the home.176 
Most recently, in United States v. Jones,177 the Court addressed 
the use of a GPS tracking device.178 In Jones, police placed a GPS de-
vice on the defendant’s car to track his movements for twenty-eight 
days.179 The Court unanimously held that the use of the GPS device 
was a search under the Fourth Amendment, but decided it on dif-
ferent grounds than previous tracking cases. The majority relied on 
the trespass theory set out in Olmstead, focusing on the physical 
intrusion on Jones’s car to find the search unreasonable.180 Justice 
Scalia, writing for the majority, declined to apply the Katz test be-
cause “Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the 
Katz formulation.”181 He reminded the Court that the Katz test did 
not narrow the scope of the Fourth Amendment.182 In other words, 
placement of the beeper on Jones’s car was enough to constitute an 
unreasonable search under the trespass theory without any need to 
address reasonable expectation of privacy in Jones’s movements. 
Justice Scalia recognized that if Jones had been tracked by electronic 
means, without an incidental trespass, that the outcome of the de-
cision may have been different, but declined to address that issue.183 
Justices Sotomayor and Alito, however, did apply the Katz 
analysis in their concurrences. Justice Sotomayor urged the Court to 
consider potential technological advances in surveillance technol-
ogies.184 Justice Sotomayor argued that the unique attributes of 
 
173. Id. at 34–37. 
174. Id. at 29–30. 
175. Id. at 30. 
176. Id. at 34. 
177. 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
178. Id. at 402. 
179. Id. at 403. 
180. Id. at 404–06. 
181. Id. at 406. 
182. Id. at 406–07. 
183. Id. at 412. 
184. Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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surveillance technology, such as GPS monitoring, should be taken into 
account when analyzing reasonable expectation of privacy, stating, “I 
would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements 
will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the govern-
ment to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious 
beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”185 Justice Sotomayor added that 
application of the third-party doctrine is ill suited to the digital age.186 
Justice Alito rejected the use of the trespass test altogether and 
argued that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
long-term monitoring.187 
B. How Courts Have Applied the Fourth Amendment to CSLI. 
The Sixth Circuit held, in United States v. Carpenter,188 that cell 
phone users did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
cell phone records conveyed to cell service providers.189 The court 
analogized Carpenter’s situation to the Supreme Court’s finding in 
Smith to confirm the conclusion.190 The Fourth,191 Fifth,192 and 
Eleventh193 Circuits have come to similar conclusions. 
 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 417. 
187. Id. at 424–25 (Alito, J., concurring). 
188.  819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016).  
189. Id. at 883–84 (finding that the government’s collection of phone records showing 
defendants’ geographical locations did not constitute a warrantless search 
violating the Fourth Amendment). 
190. Id. at 887–88 (holding that, just as Smith did not have an expectation of 
privacy in the phone numbers collected by the government, Carpenter similarly 
did not have an expectation of privacy in the location data collected by the 
government through phone records). 
191. United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 424, 427 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc) 
(holding that, under the third-party doctrine, the government did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment because the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the historical CSLI collected by the defendant’s cell phone 
provider).  
192. In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 
(5th Cir. 2013) (finding that orders to obtain cell-site information for a 
specific phone placing and terminating calls are not “categorically 
unconstitutional,” as the Fourth Amendments protects only reasonable 
expectations of privacy). 
193. United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 518 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding that the 
defendant had a diminished expectation of privacy in records created and kept 
by his cellular phone company, and the disclosure of the records did not 
constitute an unconstitutional invasion of privacy). 
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In United States v. Graham,194 the Fourth Circuit specifically 
addressed Justice Alito’s concerns of twenty-four hour “dragnet” 
surveillance that he expressed in his concurring opinion in Jones.195 In 
Graham, law enforcement acquired CSLI that spanned over 200 
days.196 The District Court held that the defendant did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell-site records, relying on 
the third-party doctrine established in Smith, and that the amount of 
CSLI obtained from law enforcement did not change this expectation 
of privacy.197 The decision was later affirmed—but criticized—by the 
Fourth Circuit in 2015, when the court held that the defendant did 
have an expectation of privacy in his CSLI, but admitted the evidence 
because law enforcement relied in good faith on court orders issued in 
accordance with the SCA.198 In 2016, the Fourth Circuit reheard its 
2015 decision in Graham and reverted back to the district court’s 
original holding—that cell phone users do not enjoy a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in historical CSLI.199 This decision eliminated 
the “circuit split” among courts, and seemingly closed the door to 
possible Supreme Court review.200  
Although the issue of whether the third-party doctrine squarely 
applies to historical CSLI obtained from a cell service provider 
appears to have been resolved, the issue of voluntariness is often 
challenged.201 It seems critics find that since the signals cellular phones 
 
194. 796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015), aff’d on reh’g en banc on other grounds, 824 
F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016). 
195. Id. at 347. 
196. United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 387 (D. Md. 2012), aff’d on 
other grounds, 796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 824 F.3d 
421 (4th Cir. 2016). 
197. Id. at 387–90. 
198. Graham, 796 F.3d at 338. 
199. Graham, 824 F.3d at 427. See also Robinson Meyer, No One Will Save You 
From Cellphone Tracking Unless the Supreme Court Acts, Atlantic (June 2, 
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/06/fourth-circuit-
csli-cellphone-location-tracking-legal/485225/ [https://perma.cc/D9R2-VPBS] 
(discussing the Fourth Circuit’s en banc reversal of its previous decision as a 
result of the “third-party doctrine,” limiting a defendant’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy). 
200. Meyer, supra note 199. However, on June 5, 2017, the Supreme Court granted 
certiori to review the descision in Carpenter. United States v. Carpenter, 819 
F.3d 880, 883–84 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (June 5, 2017) 
(No. 16-402). 
201. See, e.g., Brief for the Center for Democracy & Technology as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 20–22, Carpenter v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 2211 
(No. 16-402) (arguing that the voluntariness requirement should not be 
considered in expectation of privacy analysis); Brief for United States Justice 
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emit are automatic and continuous, the user cannot voluntary share 
CSLI information in any meaningful way. Only one circuit court has 
addressed whether cell phone users have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in CSLI captured prospectively by cell service providers at 
law enforcement’s request. In United States v. Skinner,202 the Sixth 
Circuit, applying Knotts, held that Skinner did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his CSLI while traveling along public 
roadways.203 However, the court did not address whether Skinner 
would maintain this expectation of privacy if he had traveled within 
the constitutionally protected area of his home. 
In 2012, United States v. Rigmaiden204 was the first case in a 
federal court to address the issue of StingRay use. In an order denying 
the defendant’s motion to suppress, the court held that Rigmaiden did 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his CSLI. The court 
relied on the fact that Rigmaiden fraudulently obtained both the 
aircard that law enforcement tracked and the apartment where he was 
located.205 Therefore, akin to the reasoning in Rakas v. Illinois,206 he 
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his wrongful pres-
ence within the apartment. 
The U.S. District Court for the Southern Disrtict of New York, in 
United States v. Lambis,207 was the first federal court to uphold 
suppression of evidence obtained from a StingRay. In Lambis, the 
Drug Enforcement Administration utilized a StingRay to locate 
Lambis in his home.208 Analogizing to Kyllo, the court held that use of 
a StingRay device to locate Lambis in his home was an unreasonable 
search because “the ‘pings’ from [his] cellphone to the nearest cell site 
were not readily available ‘to anyone who wanted to look’ . . . .”209 
 
Foundation, et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 33–34, Carpenter 
v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (No. 16-402) (arguing that CSLI is not 
voluntarily conveyed to cell service providers, but is mandated by government). 
202. 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012). 
203. Id. at 781, 777–78. 
204. 844 F. Supp. 2d 982 (D. Ariz. 2012). 
205. United States v. Rigmaiden, No. CR 08-814-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 1932800, at *6 
(D. Ariz. May 8, 2013). 
206. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
207. 197 F. Supp. 3d 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
208. Id. at 609. 
209. Id. at 609–10 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)).  
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V. IMSI-Catchers and the Fourth Amendment. 
A. The Third-Party Doctrine 
Although collection of historical and prospective CSLI fits more 
squarely within the third-party doctrine when obtained through a cell 
service provider, a law enforcement officer’s use of an IMSI-catcher 
does not. Even though a cell phone may simultaneously convey the 
same location information to a StingRay device and a cell site oper-
ated by the carrier, StingRay devices obtain the information directly 
from the cellular phone. A StingRay never retrieves the cell-site 
information from the cellular service provider, therefore it effectively 
circumvents the third party. However, the third-party doctrine is not 
necessary to find a lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
CSLI. 
B. Surveillance in Constitutionally Protected Areas.  
As recognized in Karo, law enforcement’s surveillance of indi-
viduals within a home presents higher privacy concerns.210 The Court 
reasoned that “[i]f a DEA agent had entered the house in question 
without a warrant to verify that the ether was in the house, he would 
have engaged in an unreasonable search . . . .”211 However, the same 
could have been said for the situation in Knotts, in which law 
enforcement tracked the location of the chloroform to the inside of the 
defendant’s home.212 The Court noted that there was no evidence that 
“the beeper was used after the location in the area of the cabin had 
been initially determined.”213 The reasoning that apparently distin-
guishes Knotts from Karo is that “[e]ven if visual surveillance has 
revealed that the article to which the beeper is attached has entered 
the house, the later monitoring not only verifies the officers’ observa-
tions but also establishes that the article remains on the premises.”214 
But the Court did not recognize that law enforcement could have 
discovered the ether inside the home through regular visual surveil-
lance as well. If a DEA agent had physically followed Karo as he 
traveled with the can of ether, he would have also observed—without 
any need to enter the premises—Karo entering the home with the 
ether, and he also would have subsequently observed Karo leaving 
with the ether and traveling to other private homes. With regular 
 
210. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1984). 
211. Id. at 706. 
212. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278–79. 
213. Id. 
214. Karo, 468 U.S. at 715. 
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surveillance from outside of the home, law enforcement could confirm 
that the ether remained in the home by the simple fact that it had 
not been taken out yet. 
It could also be argued that continuous tracking of an object 
within a home reveals movements throughout the home that could 
not be discovered through regular visual surveillance. However, a 
StingRay, at its best, can decipher the location of a cell phone within 
a couple meters.215 Law enforcement cannot tell the difference if your 
phone is in your bathroom or ten feet away in your bedroom, because 
the technology is simply not capable of such precise tracking. 
Regardless of the adverse holdings in Karo and Knotts, there is 
one important distinction between use of a government-installed 
beeper and the government’s use of a StingRay device. In Karo, law 
enforcement placed the GPS tracker inside of a can without Karo’s 
knowledge, but StingRay devices capture information that the user of 
a cell phone knows is broadcasted outside of the home. As stated in 
the seminal case establishing the test for a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his 
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection.”216 Cell phone users are aware that their cell phones auto-
matically search for cell towers when powered on, and entrance into 
the home does not change this expectation. It is of no consequence 
whether the cell phone user is aware that the government is capturing 
the information that the cell phone is sending rather than the cell 
service provider, because as the Court held in Hoffa, the Fourth 
Amendment does not apply to information disclosed to an undercover 
government actor. StingRays are essentially undercover cell towers, 
and it does not make a difference whether a cell phone user knows 
that the particular cell tower it has connected to is owned by a 
government actor. 
 
 
 
 
215. The “Stingray”, Government’s New Tracking and Surveillance Tool, 
Experienced Crim. Law. (Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.experiencedcriminal 
lawyers.com/stingray-government-tracking-and-surveillance-tool/ 
[https://perma.cc/2EJX-8EBM]. 
216. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). See also Lewis v. United 
States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966) (discussing the lack of a Fourth Amendment 
violation when the petitioner invited an undercover agent into his home for 
the purpose of selling the agent narcotics); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 
563 (1927) (finding that the use of a searchlight that revealed cases of illegal 
liquor on a ship’s deck prior to the boarding of the ship by Coast Guard 
officials did not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
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Of course, one could counter this argument by quoting Scalia’s 
opinion in Kyllo, in which he conditioned the fact that the use of 
thermal-imaging technology was a search because it was not “in 
general public use.”217 But, as explained by Orin Kerr, “no case has 
taken Kyllo beyond the facts of the case itself, and no court has 
viewed Kyllo as a symbolic endorsement of broad privacy rights in 
new technologies.”218 This result is largely due to the difficulty in 
deciphering what exactly defines general public use. The thermal-
imaging device used in Kyllo—decided only sixteen years before this 
Comment was written—is arguably in general public use today given 
the fact that these types of devices are available for purchase at your 
local Home Depot for installation on your phone.219 Application of 
Scalia’s “general public use” doctrine becomes moot as soon as 
technology advances. Putting aside the general public use argument, 
use of a StingRay device to locate a phone is distinct from use of a 
thermal-imaging device to detect heat emanating from a home in one 
key respect: StingRay devices are used to decipher the location of an 
object and a thermal-imaging device, as used in Kyllo, was used to 
reveal a fact about the home that could not have been deciphered 
through regular visual surveillance. Although the thermal-imaging 
device was used with the intention of locating marijuana, in order to 
locate the marijuana law enforcement had to first discover the tem-
perature of the home.  
C. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Content Versus Non-Content 
Data 
The expectation of privacy in CSLI should be analyzed in the 
same way as other forms of technology in which users trasmit non-
content data or communications. The United States Courts of 
Appeals for the Third,220 Ninth,221 and Tenth222 Circuits have rejected 
 
217. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
218. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional 
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219. See, e.g., FLIR ONE-Thermal Imaging Camera for Android, Home Depot, 
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220. United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 573–74 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding that 
there is not a reasonable expectation of privacy in an IP address because it is 
voluntarily conveyed to third parties). 
221. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that 
Internet users have no expectation of privacy in their IP information, because 
the information is provided to Internet providers “for the specific purpose of 
directing the routing of information”). 
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the idea that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in non-
content-transmittal data such as email addresses or IP addresses. 
In Forrester, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that “[t]he government’s 
surveillance of e-mail addresses also may be technologically 
sophisticated, but it is conceptually indistinguishable from govern-
ment surveillance of physical mail.”223 During an investigation of an 
Ecstasy-manufacturing operation, the government utilized various sur-
veillance techniques to monitor the defendant’s e-mail and Internet 
activity.224 The government installed a pen register known as a 
“mirror port” on the defendant’s account and acquired not only the e-
mail addresses he communicated with but the IP addresses of the 
websites he had visited and the total volume of information sent from 
his account.225 The court cited to Ex parte Jackson,226 in which the 
Supreme Court held “[l]etters and sealed packages of this kind in the 
mail are as fully guarded from examination and inspection, except as 
to their outward form and weight, as if they were retained by the 
parties forwarding them in their own domiciles.”227 
StingRay devices, as used by the United States government, 
operate in the same way as the mirror port in Forrester. Both devices 
acquire information as it is transmitted to a third party or parties. 
This is not the same as the third-party doctrine, because the infor-
mation does not reach the third-party recipient before transmission to 
the government. As stated in Carpenter, “[a]lthough the content of 
personal communications is private, the information necessary to get 
those communications from point A to point B is not.”228 For these 
reasons, a cell phone user’s reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
CSLI when obtained by government-operated IMSI-catchers, such as 
the StingRay, should be analyzed in the context of content versus 
 
222. United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1205 (10th Cir. 2008) (discussing 
that the use of peer-to-peer software, allowing others to access a computer, 
could expose information to the public and thus reduced any expectation of 
privacy in a computer’s contents). 
223. Forrester, 512 F.3d at 511. 
224. Id. at 505. 
225. Id. 
226. 96 U.S. 727 (1877). 
227. Forrester, 512 F.3d at 511 (quoting Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733). See also United 
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non-content data. This distinction makes the most sense in the con-
text of contemporary Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Because 
regulation of StingRays in the United States limits the type of data 
that may be obtained to non-content data, users do not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the CSLI collected by 
government-operated IMSI-catchers.  
Conclusion 
Privacy interests must balance the interests of the individual and 
the interests of law enforcement; sacrificing one for the other does not 
benefit society as a whole. Cell phone users do not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the information their phones disseminate to 
third parties. Differentiating non-content information from content in-
formation strikes a necessary balance between individual privacy and 
effective law enforcement. 
Supreme Court precedent on the Fourth Amendment and 
technology as it stands today—as applied to government acquisition 
of CSLI—results in the conclusion that it is not a search. Although 
the Supreme Court will likely limit its ruling in Carpenter to 
historical CSLI without guidance as to government use of StingRay 
devices, the decision may motivate Congress to address the issue. If 
the Supreme Court analyzes an individual’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy in data disseminated through technology by differentiating be-
tween content and non-content data, Congress can effectively enact 
legislation that reflects that concept. In addition, Congress is in the 
best position to address Justice Alito’s concerns regarding long-term 
monitoring as expressed in Jones.229 Other concerns regarding 
collection of CSLI and the use of StingRay devices are based on 
misconceptions of how the technology is actually utilized by law 
enforcement. Greater transparency by government about the use of 
StingRay devices and effective legislation would eliminate these 
concerns. 
Although the idea of law enforcement tracking cell phones may 
give some cell phone users a sense of unease, this capability essentially 
comes with the territory of technology. As Justice Alito stated in 
Jones, “[n]ew technology may provide increased convenience or 
security at the expense of privacy . . . . [E]ven if the public does not 
welcome the diminution of privacy that new technology entails, they 
may eventually reconcile themselves to this development as 
inevitable.”230 Of course, the Supreme Court may decide to establish a 
new way of analyzing reasonable expectations of privacy as applied to 
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technology in Carpenter, and thus hold that acquisition of CSLI by 
law enforcement is an unreasonable search. But until then, we may 
just have to shut our phones off. 
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